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Abstract. This paper presents a novel access control framework reduc-
ing the access control problem to a traditional decision problem, thus
allowing a policy designer to reuse tools and techniques from the decision
theory. We propose here to express, within a single framework, the notion
of utility of an access, decisions beyond the traditional allowing/denying
of an access, the uncertainty over the effect of executing a given decision,
the uncertainty over the current state of the system, and to optimize this
process for a (probabilistic) sequence of requests. We show that an access
control mechanism including these different concepts can be specified as
a (Partially Observable) Markov Decision Process, and we illustrate this
framework with a running example, which includes notions of conflict,
critical resource, mitigation and auditing decisions, and we show that for
a given sequence of requests, it is possible to calculate an optimal policy
different from the naive one. This optimization is still possible even for
several probable sequences of requests.
Keywords: Access Control, AC-MDP, AC-POMDP, AC-DP
1 Introduction
Within an information system, the access control mechanism is in charge of con-
trolling accesses done by subjects of the system (e.g. users, processes, etc) over
objects of the system (e.g. files, processes, etc), and to deny those specified as
non secure, according to a policy. For instance, in a military setting, a top-secret
file should only be accessed by users with the appropriate credentials. In general,
the workflow of an access control mechanism can be defined in four steps: inter-
cepting accesses; collecting information relative to accesses; making a decision
about accesses; enforcing accordingly accesses. The XACML [29] architecture
defines different sub-systems responsible for these tasks: the Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) intercepts the accesses and enforces them, the Context Handler
harvests the information relative to the entities involved in the access and to
the current state of the system, and the Policy Decision Point (PDP) returns a
decision, potentially with some obligations that the PEP needs to follow when
enforcing the access.
On the one hand, the methodology for making access control decisions usually
follows a binary vision of the world, where an access control policy classifies each
access as either “good” or “bad”. Lampson [25] laid the basis of most modern
access control systems, by introducing a set of subjects, a set of objects, a set of
access modes, and the notion of access matrix, which extensively defines what
access rights have subjects over objects. An access is “good” if it belongs to the
matrix, and “bad” otherwise. An equivalent approach is to classify the states
of the system as secure or not, and to make sure that only secure states are
reachable. For instance, the Bell-LaPadula model [26] introduces the notions of
simple-security and *-security, which state that the information can only flow
up, with regard to a lattice of levels of security. Numerous access control policies
have been defined in the last decades, refining in different ways the concept of
access control matrix, but usually keeping the binary division between “good”
and “bad” accesses.
Furthermore, most access control systems are usually designed as interactive
systems, taking the current environment and a single access request, and allow
it if the access is “good”, deny it otherwise. However, allowing an access might
lead to denying another one later on, that would have been allowed otherwise.
If the latter access is “better” than the former access, then intuitively there is a
loss of utility. For instance, consider an exclusive resource, that can be accessed
by at most one user. If the system grants the access to Alice who pays only
$100 for it, then Bob, who would pay $500 for it, cannot access it. Hence, if the
system knows (or can predict) that Bob will ask to access the resource, it might
be more interesting to deny the access to Alice. In general, it might be possible
to optimize the decision process for a sequence of requests, while taking into
account some uncertainty, for instance whether Bob will actually ask the access
or not, or if the payment from Alice is fraudulent.
On the other hand, modern information systems, such as social networks, can
be open, distributed and dynamically updated [24]. In this context, it can be hard
for the Context Handler to harvest accurate and up-to-date information [23, 18].
Moreover, the effect of decisions on the system are not always entirely determin-
istic, as errors can happen. Dealing with uncertainty might therefore be required
when making access control decision, which leads to the problem of risk-based
access control [8, 19, 20, 31].
Hence, we claim that the problem of specifying an access control policy can
be seen as first associating utility values with accesses and/or states (instead of
simple “bad” or “good” values) and then optimizing the decision making process
for a sequence of requests while taking into account uncertainty over the next
request in the sequence, the effect of each decision and the current state of the
system. In other words, the access control decision problem can be reduced to a
decision problem, and analysed in a quantitative way. In order to perform such
an analysis, we present here a formalisation of the access control problem using
(Partially-Observable) Markov Decision Processes (POMDP) [3, 34].
This formalisation is done in an incremental way, and we introduce three
main decision processes, such that each one is a generalization of the previous
one:
– An Access Control Decision Process (AC-DP) works with deterministic tran-
sitions and known sequences of requests, such that an optimal policy can be
derived for this sequence, according to utility values associated with each
transition. When the sequence of requests is limited to a single request, this
process is semantically close to traditional access control mechanisms.
– An Access Control Markov Decision Process (AC-MDP) adds a dimension of
uncertainty, by considering probabilistic transitions instead of deterministic
ones. Hence, an AC-MDP deals with probabilistic sequences of requests and
with uncertain effects of decisions.
– An Access Control Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (AC-POMDP)
adds another dimension of uncertainty, by considering, in addition to prob-
abilistic transitions, uncertainty over the current state.
An AC-DP is just in instance of an AC-MDP, which is in turn just an instance
of an AC-POMDP, and in general, it follows that the optimal policy of a process
is given by Equation (6), in Section 4. Hence, the main contribution of this paper
is two-fold. First, we present a clear and illustrated framework for defining access
control systems as decision processes, thus paving the way for using techniques
from decision theory in the context of access control. Second, this framework is
presented as a methodological guide for a policy designer, for which the burden
is shifted from specifying each authorized access in each possible case to first
specifying the utility values of accesses and states, regardless of the uncertainty,
and then to specify the uncertainty of the system. The optimal policy is then
defined (or approximated) by solving the corresponding system of equations of
the POMDP. Note that we reuse the notations introduced by Cassandra in [5],
and we extend them in order to include access control concepts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the concept
of AC-DP, Section 3 adds probabilistic transitions to define the concept of AC-
MDP, Section 4 considers probabilistic states in order to define the concept of
AC-POMDP. We discuss the limitations of our framework in Section 5 and we
sketch some future works and conclude in Section 6.
Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, Markov Decision Processes have not yet been used
in the context of access control systems. However, the problem of dealing with
risk and uncertainty for access control systems has been already studied in the
literature. For instance, Aziz et al. [2] refine a policy to a more restrictive one,
in order to deal with threats.
Risk is often considered as an input to the system, that must stay below a
certain threshold. Cheng et al. introduce in [8] the Fuzzy Multi-Level Security
model, where each access is associated with a level of risk, and the final deci-
sion of the authorization mechanism is given according to some predefined risk
thresholds. Diep et al. extend this approach in [13] by considering costs in terms
of availability, integrity and confidentiality for each decision, and use thresholds
for each corresponding risk.
Some approaches aim at calculating the risk from the environment. For in-
stance, Ni et al. introduce in [31] fuzzy security parameters that can be inferred
from traditional parameters, hence introducing a notion of uncertainty directly
into the parameters of the system, while Chen and Crampton present in [7] a way
to calculate the risk for a RBAC model, using intuitive notions of competence
and distance between users, roles and permissions. The probabilistic change of
security attributes is considered by Krautsevich et al. in [19], who model this
change using a Markov chain.
Dealing with uncertainty requires quantitative techniques, and therefore ac-
cesses must be associated with a utility value. Some models use these notions,
for instance Krautsevich et al. extend in [21] the auto-delegation mechanism [11]
with probabilistic availability, reusing some notions of utility functions previously
introduced in [18]. Similarly, Molloy et al. present in [28] a model to predict and
make local decisions under uncertainty, where the system needs to choose be-
tween taking a decision locally or defer it to a central server, according to the
utility of the access and the cost of communicating the server.
Beyond the scope of access control, several pieces of work use the concept of
Markov Decision Process (MDP) in the context of security. For instance, Kreidl
introduces in [22] a simple MDP with only three states (normal, under attack
and failure) and three decisions (wait, defend and reset), which analyses the cost
of defending countermeasures against the cost of an intrusion.
Similarly, He et al. present in [14] an analysis of the operational costs and the
negative and positive impact of security countermeasures using Domain Parti-
tional Markov Decision Processes, which partition the network into several secu-
rity domains, each domain coming with its own MDP. This work, as the previous
one, mostly focuses on the detection of intrusions and the decisions needed when
some are discovered.
Finally, Singh et al. use in [33] an MDP to make channel assignments for
network devices. This problem can be considered as a special instance of an
access control problem, where the devices ask to access channels, with a specific
policy stating that any device can access a channel, but the more devices use
a given channel, the lower is the utility for this channel. Hence, our approach
can be seen as a more general approach, where the policy is not constrained.
Moreover, we also consider decisions beyond allow/deny.
2 AC-DP
Cassandra gives in [5] the example for a decision process of a robot trying to
survive in a real-world environment: the robot observes the environment, detects
an obstacle or not, and decides which direction to move to. It can also decides to
take autonomous decisions, for instance about auditing and fixing itself. Because
the robot can predict, with some uncertainty, how the environment or itself will
react to its actions, it can optimize the actions it takes, rather than simply
making a decision with respect to the current environment. Intuitively, we want
to follow an analogous approach to describe an access control decision process,
that is, a process taking an environment and a request, and making a decision
(such as allow or deny) about this request, which leads to a new environment
and a new request to control, for which a new decision needs to be made.
In this section, we make two assumptions: the effect of a decision is determin-
istic, and the exact sequence of requests is known and finite. Such assumptions
are well-suited for closed systems working in batch-mode or dealing with complex
tasks. For instance, the queries to a database often consist of nested sub-queries,
which, in terms of access control, translates to having nested access requests (e.g.
one for each table accessed by the query). Similarly, the permission to execute a
program is implied by the permission of accessing each resource accessed by this
program. Note that it is always possible to consider a sequence to be reduced
to a single request, in order to work in a traditional setting. However, we claim
(and we will illustrate) that knowing the sequence of requests might allow the
decision process to make better decisions. We consider in the following sections
systems for which these assumptions do not hold.
Hence, a decision process is a labelled transition system, where each state
represents the state of the system together with the current request to control,
and each transition represents a decision made by the controller. We present
the notion of state in Section 2.1, the transition function in Section 2.2, the
utility and reward function in Section 2.3, and finally the notion of AC-DP in
Section 2.4. These different concepts are illustrated with a running example,
that we extend along the paper in order to illustrate the expressivity of our
framework.
2.1 System State
In order to design an autonomous process, we choose to define the request that
needs to be controlled as part of the state of the system. A transition is therefore
a simple decision from the state with the current request, and leads to another
state, which either includes another request that needs to be controlled or in-
cludes a special request  meaning that no request needs to be controlled, thus
expressing the end of the request.
We realize that this design decision might seem counter-intuitive, and an
alternative way could be to define a transition as a pair (request, decision).
However, such an approach would lead to consider for each state an active tran-
sition (the one with the current request that needs to be controlled) and inac-
tive transitions (all the others), that cannot be taken. This implies a complex
management of active transitions, and we believe that our approach is more ap-
propriate, especially when the sequence of requests is probabilistic (as it is the
case for AC-MDP and AC-POMDP).
Hence, we define an access control state in two parts: the security information,
i.e. all the information required to make an access control decision, and the access
request that needs to be controlled. Writing I for the set of security information
and R for the set of access requests, we therefore define the set of access control
states as Σ = I × R. Furthermore, we write A for the set of decisions, and
it follows that an access control policy is a function δ : Σ → A, that is, a
function that takes a state including a request to be controlled, and returns a
decision about this request. Finally, we define a special request , such that for
any security information ι, the state (ι, ) represents the state where no request
needs to be evaluated.
Running Example In order to illustrate the different concepts we present in
this paper, we introduce a running example. Let us consider a system with a set
S of subjects and a set O of objects, such that an access is a pair (s, o) ∈ S ×O
(we deliberately omit the access mode, for the sake of simplicity). A subject can
be either registered or not, which is denoted by a function reg : S → {0, 1}.
Similarly, an object can be either confidential or not, which is denoted by the
function cf : O → {0, 1}. When no confusion can arise, given a subject si and
an object oj , we will write regi and cf j for reg(si) and cf(oj), respectively. The
security information part of a state (ι, r) is therefore a triple ι = (reg, cf ,m),
where m ⊆ S × O is the set of accesses previously granted. The interest of
this set is to be able to define conflicts between accesses, as we will see when
defining the reward function in Section 2.3. The set of decisions is (at this stage)
A = {allow,deny}.
2.2 Transition Function
As we said above, a decision process is a labelled transition, where each transition
corresponds to the execution of a particular decision, and therefore the policy
designer must also specify the transition function T : Σ × A → Σ, such that
given a state σ and a decision a, T (σ, a) stands for the state obtained from σ by
executing the decision a.
Since a state consists of some security information ι and a request r, the
transition function T can be split into two independent transition functions
Tι : Σ ×A → I and Tr : Σ ×A → R, such that given a state σ and a decision
a, T (σ, a) = (Tι(σ, a), Tr(σ, a)). These two transition functions represent both
aspects of the transformation of a state.
Indeed, the function Tι is responsible for describing the effect over the security
information of making a decision about a request. Such a function is intuitively
equivalent to traditional transition functions in access control systems, where a
state only contains the security information part.
The function Tr is on the contrary responsible for returning the following re-
quest that needs to be controlled. When only a single request is known, we define
Tr(σ, a) = , for any state σ and any decision a. In practice, we could directly
include a concrete sequence of requests in the state, and remove requests from
this sequence as the system controls them. However, such a concrete structure
does not bring much in the decision process and tends to obfuscate the exposi-
tion of the framework, so we leave the concrete definition of the function Tr to
be done at the implementation level.
Running Example Although the function Tr changes for each sequence of re-
quests, we can define the transition function Tι, which simply adds the requested
access when it is allowed, ans does nothing otherwise:
Tι((reg, cf ,m), , a) = (reg, cf ,m)
Tι((reg, cf ,m), (s, o),allow) = (reg, cf ,m ∪ {(s, o)})
Tι((reg, cf ,m), (s, o),deny) = (reg, cf ,m)
2.3 Utility and Reward Function
An important aspect of a decision process is the ability to give a utility value to
a decision or a state. In other words, it is possible to express the interest for the
system of making a given decision in a given state, and we introduce an utility
domain U . The general idea is that when confronted with several decision to
make, the controller chooses the one offering the best utility.
For instance, a very simple utility domain is the set {good,bad}. Such a set
follows the traditional intuition behind access control policies, but provides little
flexibility. For instance, if every possible decision in a given state is associated
with the utility bad, the controller does not know which one to choose. Hence,
we usually consider richer utility domains, such as R, which can provide finer-
grained decisions. Note that it is possible to say that a negative value is equivalent
to bad, while a positive one is equivalent to good, however, if the system has to
choose between two decisions leading to different negative utility values, it can
choose the “best” solution between two bad options.
The policy designer must then specify a reward functionW : Σ×A×Σ → U ,
such that given two states σi and σj , and a decision a, W(σi, a, σj) stands for
the reward of making the decision a in the state σi and arriving in the state σj ,
and we write waij for such a reward. The reward function W can be defined in
many different ways, for instance by associating a utility value for reaching a
particular state σj , or by giving the utility value of taking the decision a for a
request r.
Intuitively, if there is no access request to control, then the decision taken by
the process is irrelevant, and therefore there should not be any reward associated
with such a situation. Hence, we have the following assumption:
∀σi, σj ∈ Σ ∀ι ∈ I ∀a ∈ A σi = (ι, )⇒ waij = 0 (1)
Note that the reward waij does not depend on the transition function T ,
which is the reason why the state σj is explicit in the definition of W. However,
given a state σi and a decision a, since we consider in this section that the
transition function is deterministic, there is a single state σj reachable, namely
T (σi, a). For the sake of the exposition (and to be consistent with the notations
introduced in the following sections), we introduce the value qai , which indicates
the reward for executing the decision a from the state σi, and which is defined
by qai =W(σi, a, T (σi, a)).
Clearly, defining the function W for a concrete system might be a complex
task [12], and this has been recently considered by Kephart [17] as a challenge
that needs to be addressed by the security community. A traditional approach,
inherited from the finance world, where decision mechanisms have been used for
a long time, is to associate a pecuniary value with each access. For instance,
Symantec revealed in its 2011 survey [37] that “20% of businesses lost at least
$195,000 as a result of cyber-attacks”. Hence, a state identifying the violation
of a security property could be associated with a negative reward of $195,000.
Moreover, once pecuniary values have been associated with some entities, mar-
kets techniques can be used to derive more dynamic values [27].
The aim of this framework is not to define concrete utility values, but rather
to provide the tools to take advantage of them. As we discuss in Section 5, we
acknowledge the fact that it is a challenging task (and so is defining an actual
policy in general), but we believe that a framework such as the one presented
here can help the policy designer to define accurate and meaningful values.
Running Example We first associate each access (si, oj) with a value using
the function rew1, which is defined in Table 1.
rew1(si, oj) regi = 0 regi = 1
cf j = 0 4 6
cf j = 1 −10 10
Table 1. Rewards for single accesses
Note that these values are arbitrary: they represent the intuitive idea that
giving a confidential object to a non-registered subject is “bad”, and otherwise,
giving an access to a registered subject has a high value (because she potentially
knows best how to use it), and granting an access to a confidential object has
high value (because they potentially have more useful information).
In order to model the fact that an object should not be accessed by more than
one user, we introduce the reward function rew2 expressed over sets of accesses,
such that rew2(m) = −100 if there exists an object o and two different subjects
s and s′ such that (s, o) and (s′, o) belong to m, and rew2(m) = 0 otherwise.
The reward function W is defined from the functions rew1 and rew2. Given
two states σi = (reg, cf ,m, r) and σj = (reg′, cf ′,m′, r′), we define:
waij =

0 if r =  or σj 6= T (σi, a)
rew2(m′) if a = deny
rew1(s, o) + rew2(m′) if r = (s, o) and a = allow
When there is no request to control (i.e. when r = ), there is no reward.
Similarly, the reward for arriving in a state σj that is different from the one
obtained using the transition function is null, as it is impossible (this situation
will change when we consider later on probabilistic transitions). Otherwise, we
always consider the reward associated with the resulting set of accesses1 (i.e.
rew2(m′)), and if we grant the access, we also add the reward associated with
this particular access (i.e. rew1(s, o)).
2.4 AC-DP
Intuitively, a decision process takes some security information and a request, and
returns which decision to take. The choice of this decision is made by a policy,
whose aim is to maximise the utility value.
Definition 1 An Access Control Decision Process (AC-DP) is tuple 〈Σ,A, T ,W〉,
where Σ = I × R is a set of access control states, A is a set of decisions,
T : Σ × A → Σ is a transition function and W : Σ × A × Σ → U is a reward
function.
(ι1, r1)
(ι2, r2)T (ι1, r1, a1) = (ι′2, r2) = T (ι1, r1, a2)
a1 a2
(ι3, r3) (ι
′
3, r3)
a1 a2
(ι4, ) (ι
′
4, )
a1 a2
Fig. 1. Example of AC-DP for the sequence r1; r2; r3 and for the set of decisions A =
{a1, a2}
Figure 1 illustrates an AC-DP for the sequence of requests r1; r2; r3 and the
set of decisions A = {a1, a2}: from the initial state (ι1, r1), the proces can either
choose a1 or a2, leading respectively to (ι2, r2) and (ι′2, r2) (for the sake of the
illustration, we did not consider here the case where the request r1 would need
to be evaluated again, however such situations are covered in the following with
the introduction of mitigations techniques). The process keeps going on until
reaching states where the request to be controlled is , such as the states (ι4, )
and (ι′4, ). In this particular example, we can see that there are 2
3 paths possible.
1 Clearly, when the access is denied, we have m = m′, and therefore we could equiva-
lently consider rew2(m).
The policy defines which path to choose, and in order to specify the policy,
we define the value of a policy δ to be the sum of the rewards accumulated by the
AC-DP when starting from a given state and by choosing the decisions returned
by the policy. This value is given by the value function V δ : Σ → U of a policy
δ, which is defined as:
V δ(σi) = q
δ(σi)
i + β · V δ(T (σi, δ(σi))) (2)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is a discounting factor. This factor is used to potentially attach
less importance to the rewards obtained in the future.
A policy δ∗ is said to be optimal if, and only if, for any state σi and any
other policy δ, V δ
∗
(σi) ≥ V δ(σi). From Equation (2), we can define the optimal
policy as:
δ∗(σi) = arg max
a∈A
[qai + β · V δ
∗
(T (σi, a))] (3)
where arg max stands for the function returning one element maximizing the
formula. Note that this definition is potentially recursive, since the decision se-
lected by δ∗ from σi depends on the value of the policy for T (σi, a), which can be
equal to σi. Moreover, if the set of spaces is infinite (for instance by considering
an infinite number of subjects and/or objects), it might not be possible to define
an optimal policy.
It is worth observing that when only single request are considered instead of
sequences of request, i.e. when Tr(σ, a) = , for any state σ and any decision a,
then the value of a policy is simply the reward associated with taking the decision
indicated by this policy. Indeed, in this case, in Equation (2), the request of the
state T (σi, δ(σi)) is equal to , and following Equation (1), we can deduce that
V δ(T (σi, δ(σi))) = 0. Moreover, if the utility domain is defined as {good,bad},
then the reward function is semantically equivalent to a traditional policy, classi-
fying each transition into the good ones and the bad ones. Hence, any traditional
access control policy can be easily expressed in our framework.
Running Example Let S = {s1, s2}, such that s1 is registered while s2 is
not, i.e. reg1 = 1 and reg2 = 0, and O = {o1, o2} such that o1 is confidential
and o2 is not, i.e. cf1 = 1 and cf2 = 0. Let us also consider the sequence of
requests (s2, o1), (s2, o2), (s1, o2). We implement this sequence by defining the
initial state σ0 = (reg, cf , ∅, (s2, o1)), and the request transition function Tr,
such that for any ι and for any decision a:
Tr(ι, (s2, o1), a) = (s2, o2)
Tr(ι, (s2, o2), a) = (s1, o2)
Tr(ι, (s1, o2), a) = 
Because of the function rew2, the accesses (s2, o2) and (s2, o1) cannot be both
accepted at the same time, otherwise the system would get a reward of −100. Let
us call δ1 the naive policy allowing an access if the associated reward is positive,
and denying it otherwise. We can see on Figure 2 that V δ
1
(σ0) = 14 (we consider
in this example a discounting factor β = 1). This policy is however not optimal:
indeed, let us consider the policy δ2 only allowing accesses from registered users,
and denying all others. As shown on Figure 2, we have V δ
2
(σ0) = 16, and it
follows V δ2(σ0) > V δ1(σ0). The policy δ2 is not optimal either, since if only
unregistered users ask for accesses, then this policy will get a value of 0, while
another policy allowing the accesses to non-confidential files obtains a higher
value.
(∅, (s2, o1))
Policy δ1
(∅, (s2, o2))reward = 0
({(s2, o2)}, (s1, o2))reward = 4
({(s2, o2)}, (s1, o1))reward = 0
({(s2, o2), (s1, o1)}, )reward = 10
Total reward for δ1 = 14
deny
allow
deny
allow
(∅, (s2, o1))
Policy δ2
(∅, (s2, o2)) reward = 0
(∅, (s1, o2)) reward = 0
({(s1, o2)}, (s1, o1)) reward = 6
({(s1, o2), (s1, o1)}, ) reward = 10
Total reward for δ2 = 16
deny
deny
allow
allow
Fig. 2. Policy examples
This simple example illustrates the fact that the policy always selecting the
decision returning the best immediate reward is not always optimal, and that
when the sequence of requests is known, it can be worth inspecting it in order to
find the best policy for this state. For finite sequences of requests, the number
of possibilities to consider is finite for a given state, and the best policy can be
calculated using Equation (3).
Extended Running Example In the previous example, we have shown that
an AC-DP is able to consider sequences of requests in order to find the best
policy for a given state. We now show that an AC-DP is also able to choose
between two “bad” situations. In order to illustrate this case, we add a new
reward function rew3 defined over sets of accesses, that states that the object
o1 is a critical resource and needs to be accessed, such as the medical record of
a patient currently having a heart attack. We define rew3(m) = rew2(m′) + 50
if there exists a subject s such that (s, o1) belongs to m and rew2(m) otherwise,
and we redefine the reward function W as follows:
waij =

0 if r =  or σj 6= T (σi, a)
rew3(m′) if a = deny
rew1(s, o) + rew3(m′) if a = allow
Consider now the state σ1 = (reg, cf , ∅, (s2, o1)). Based on the new reward
function, we can calculate that qallow1 = 50 − 10 = 40, while qdeny1 = 0. In
other words, it is more interesting for the system to allow this access, even
though the access itself has a negative reward. However, with the state σ2 =
(reg, cf , {(s1, o1)}, (s2, o1)), that is, the state where s1 is already accessing o1
and where s2 asks to access it, we have qallow2 = 50 − 100 − 10 = −60, and
qdeny2 = 50, and in this case it is more interesting to deny this access. Note that
this property would still hold without rew2.
The fact that the system might need to allow “bad” accesses leads to using
mitigation strategies, that are, roughly speaking, methods to limit the exposure
of an access. For instance, the resolution of a picture can be downgraded, a
monitoring system can be enforced, etc. Such techniques usually have a cost,
that we express here in terms of reduced utility, both for positive values (reduced
gains) and negative values (reduced losses).
For the sake of this example, we extend the previous definition for a state,
such that a state σ is now a tuple (reg, cf ,m,mit), where reg, cf and m are
defined as before, and where mit = 1 if mitigations procedures are enforced,
and mit = 0 otherwise. Moreover, we introduce a new decision mitigate, such
that executing this decision set the value of mit to 1. This decision has the
particularity not to change the request to be controlled. More formally, we define:
Tι((reg, cf ,m,mit), r,mitigate) = (reg, cf ,m, 1)
Tr((reg, cf ,m), r,mitigate) = r
We define a new reward function rew4 returning the utility of accesses when
mitigation techniques are enforced, such that rew4(s, o) is equal to half the
value of rew1(s, o). The reward function is modified such that, given two states
σi = (reg, cf ,m,mit) and σj = (reg′, cf ′,m′,mit′), for any decision a, we have:
waij =

0 if r =  or σj 6= T (σi, a)
or a = mitigate
rew3(m′) if a = deny
rew4(s, o) + rew3(m′) if a = allow and mit′ = 1
rew1(s, o) + rew3(m′) if a = allow and mit′ = 0
Note that this reward function only considers the mitigation status for new
accesses, and not old ones, implying that an access granted while mitigation
techniques are enforced will always be mitigated, even if these techniques are
suspended in the future. Clearly, a concrete implementation might require a
finer-grained mitigation management, but this specification suffices to illustrate
the usage of mitigations.
Indeed, consider the state σ3 = (reg, cf , ∅, 0, (s2, o1)), which is equivalent to
the previous state σ1 with no mitigation techniques enforced. Clearly, we have
qallow3 = 40 and q
deny
3 = q
mitigate
3 = 0. Hence, the naive policy would still be to
directly allow the access (s2, o1). However, if we define σ4 = (reg, cf , ∅, 1, (s2, o1)),
we have T (σ3,mitigate) = σ4 and qallow4 = 45. In this case, we can observe that
the most interesting policy is for the AC-DP to make an autonomous decision,
that is to start mitigation techniques, before allowing a “bad” access.
3 Markov Decision Process
The notion of AC-DP presented in the previous section assumes that transitions
between states are deterministic, that is, given a state and a decision, the process
knows exactly what is the next state. However, in general, it is not always possible
to know the exact sequence of requests. Moreover, the effect of a decision over
the security information might be non deterministic, for instance for hybrid
systems involving hardware, where faults can happen. This section introduces
the notion of Access Control Markov Decision Process (AC-MDP), which is a
Markov Decision Process where the state is an access control state.
Roughly speaking, an AC-MDP is an AC-DP with probabilistic transitions.
Hence, the main novelty of this section is the introduction of the probability
function P : Σ ×A×Σ → [0, 1], which replaces the transition function T .
3.1 AC-MDP
Definition 2 An Access Control Markov Decision Process (AC-MDP) is a tuple
〈Σ,A,P,W〉, where Σ = I × R is a set of access control states, A is a set of
decisions, P : Σ×A×Σ → [0, 1] is the probability function, such that P(σi, a, σj)
stands for the probability of reaching the state σj by executing the decision a
from the state σi, and W : Σ × A × Σ → U is the reward function, such that
W(σi, a, σj) stands for the reward associated with executing the decision a from
the state σi and arriving in the state σj. When no confusion can arise, we write
paij and w
a
ij for P(σi, a, σj) and W(σi, a, σj), respectively.
We write qai for the immediate reward for executing the decision a in the state
σi:
qai =
∑
j
paij · waij
As for an AC-DP, a policy is a function δ : Σ → A, which returns for each
state the decision to execute, in other words, given a state with an access request
to control, the policy returns the decision to be made for this request. Given a
policy δ and a state σi, the value function V δ is calculated as follows:
V δ(σi) =
∑
j
p
δ(σi)
ij [w
δ(σi)
ij + β · V δ(σj)]
which can be simplified to:
V δ(σi) = q
δ(σi)
i + β
∑
j
p
δ(σi)
ij V
δ(σj) (4)
The definition of the optimal policy is refined to:
δ∗(σi) = arg max
a∈A
[qai + β
∑
j
paij V
δ∗(σj)] (5)
In a similar way that an AC-DP splits the transition function T into Tr and
Tι, the probability function P can be split into the probability functions Pr and
Pι, as we describe now.
3.2 Probabilistic Request Sequence
In some cases, even if we do not know with certainty the sequence of requests, it
might be possible to know the probability of a such a sequence to occur. Indeed,
attack patterns and behavioral analyses of users can determine the likelihood of
a given request to be submitted after another given one. For instance, it might
be observed that a user who is denied an access to a object might try to access a
similar object, or might ask her supervisor to access the object for her. Similarly,
relationships between different objects/subjects can give some indication of the
relationship between the access requests. For instance, a user accessing a master
LATEX file is likely to request to access some files included in the master file.
Assuming that the transition function Tι is defined, the policy designer can
provide a function giving the conditional probability of a request r to be the
next one, knowing the current state σ and the decision taken a, and we write
Pr(r | σ, a) for this probability. Given two states σi = (ι, r) and σj = (ι′, r′), we
define:
paij =
{
0 if ι′ 6= Tι(σi, a)
Pr(r′ | σi, a) otherwise
In practice, this probability function can be used to encode the availability of
subjects, by stating that a subject with a low probability to be available has also
a low probability to submit a request. The decision to allow a request with a low
reward depends then on the probability that a request with the same goal (for
instance accessing a critical resource) but a higher reward will be submitted in
the future, knowing that denying the access can lead to negative penalties while
waiting for the other request.
Running Example Without prior knowledge of the environment, it can be
hard to define the function Pr, especially if the subjects submitting the requests
are human beings, whose behavior cannot be always accurately predicted. How-
ever, in some cases, we can try to approximate this behavior. For instance, we
can say that if an access is already in the set of current accesses, then the cor-
responding request will not be submitted again, and that the distribution of
probabilities for other accesses is uniform.
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3
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3 deny/
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σ0 = (reg, cf , ∅, )
σ1 = (reg, cf , ∅, (s1, o1))
σ2 = (reg, cf , ∅, (s2, o1))
σ3 = (reg, cf , {(s1, o1)}, )
σ4 = (reg, cf , {(s1, o1)}, (s2, o1))
σ5 = (reg, cf , {(s2, o1)}, (s1, o1))
σ6 = (reg, cf , {(s2, o1)}, )
σ7 = (reg, cf , {(s1, o1), (s2, o1)}, )
Fig. 3. AC-MDP without unreachable states, and for S = {s1, s2}, O = {o1}, A =
{allow,deny}
Given a set of requests R (including ), a state σ = (reg, cf ,m,mit, r) and
a decision a, we first define the function α which returns the requests that are
possible after executing the decision a:
α(σ, a) =

{r} if a = mitigate or r = 
R \ (m ∪ {r}) if a = allow and r 6= 
R \m otherwise
Note that since the request  is never added to the set of curent accesses m, we
clearly have that  is always a possible request. The definition of the function
Pr is then simply:
Pr(r | σ, a) =
{
0 if r 6∈ α(σ, a)
1/card(α(σ, a)) otherwise
where card denotes the set cardinality function.
For instance, let us consider the running example of Section 2.4, without
mitigation, and, for the sake of clarity, let us consider restrict our attention to
the only object o1. In this case, we have R = {, (s1, o1), (s2, o1)}, and for the
state σ2 = (reg, cf , ∅, 0, (s2, o1)), we have:
Pr(r | σ2, a) r = (s1, o1) r = (s2, o1) r = 
a = allow 1/2 0 1/2
a = deny 1/3 1/3 1/3
Figure 3 illustrates the corresponding AC-MDP, without the unreachable states,
i.e. the states for which the probability to reach them from a different state
is null. An edge of this automaton represents the probability of the process to
move from one state to another for a given decision. For instance, the process
can move from the state σ4 to σ3 with the decision deny with a probability 1/2.
3.3 Probabilistic ι modification
In general, the access control mechanism is only a component of the informa-
tion system, and cannot entirely control that the decisions it takes are actually
enforced by the system. For instance, in Section 2, we extended the running ex-
ample to include mitigation techniques, which limit the exposure of the system
when granting an access. However, in practice, there might exist a non null prob-
ability that these techniques are not enforced. Consider for example a mitigation
technique consisting in videotaping the room in which the access is physically
done: if the video-camera is not properly functioning, then although the access
control mechanism can return the mitigate decision, the mitigation techniques
are in practice not enforced.
Regardless of the decisions returned by the access control mechanism, leaks
can also occur, and an access can be added to the set of current accesses even if
it is not allowed. In other words, the decision process must take into account the
fact that it controls a concrete system, which might not be perfect and where
errors can occur. Of course, such considerations make it harder for the access
control mechanism to take a decision, and being too pessimistic might lead to
a too conservative approach, where all accesses are denied. However, including
them might allow the policy designer to analyse worst case scenarios, and to
study the behavior of the system in such cases.
Similarly than for the probability function Pr, the policy designer can specify
a probability function Pι, such that Pι(ι | σ, a) stands for the probability of the
security information to be equal to ι when executing the decision a from the
state σ. Assuming that the transition function Tr is defined, given two states
σi = (ι, r) and σj = (ι′, r′), we define:
paij =
{
0 if r′ 6= Tr(σi, a)
Pι(ι′ | σi, a) otherwise
Running Example In order to illustrate the function Pι, we assume that the
only non deterministic part concerns the execution of mitigation techniques,
such that there exists a probability pf that these techniques are not enforced
even though the decision is mitigate. Hence, given two states σi = (ι, r) and
σj = (ι′, r′), and the function Tι defined in Section 2.2, we define:
Pι(ι′ | σi, a) =

1 if a 6= mitigate and Tι(σi, a) = ι′
pf if a = mitigate and ι = ι′
1− pf if a = mitigate and Tι(σi, a) = ι′
0 otherwise
Since the reward associated with the mitigate decision is null, this function Pι
will not change the decision process, since if the mitigation enforcement fails, the
process knows it, and can decide to ask for them again. In Section 4, we introduce
uncertainty over the states, where the actual state of the system cannot be fully
observed, and therefore it will no longer be possible to know if the mitigation
enforcement fails or not.
3.4 General Probabilistic Transition
In general, if the policy designer specifies the function Pι and Pr, given two
states σi = (ι, r) and σj = (ι′, r′), we can directly define:
paij = Pι(ι′ | σi, a) · Pr(r′ | σi, a)
Note that an AC-DP is just a particular instance of an AC-MDP, where the
probability functions are deterministic. Indeed, given the transition functions Tr
and Tι, we can easily define:
Pr(r′ | σ, a) =
{
1 if r′ = Tr(σ, a)
0 otherwise
Pι(ι′ | σ, a) =
{
1 if ι′ = Tι(σ, a)
0 otherwise
In this case, we can observe that Equation (4) can be simplified in order to
obtain Equation (2).
4 Partially-Observable Markov Decision Process
As we described in Section 3, an access control decision process might need
to take into account uncertainty over the sequence of requests and the exact
consequences of each decision. When this uncertainty can be estimated through
the functions Pr and Pι, respectively, then the process can take a decision by
quantitatively analyzing the potential outcomes.
Another degree of uncertainty that should be considered is the uncertainty
over the current state of the process. Indeed, although an AC-MDP can han-
dle uncertainty in the future, it also assumes that the current state is known.
However, this is not always the case in practice, especially in open and dis-
tributed systems, where information is collected from different, potentially unre-
liable sources. For instance, the meta-information about a file can be corrupted
during a transfer, and the exact sensitivity of this file might not be known. Sim-
ilarly, the exact location of a user might be imprecise, and only an estimation of
her probable locations might be provided.
We release this assumption in this section by introducing the notion of an
Access Control Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (AC-POMDP),
which is a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process [34] where the state is
an access control state. An AC-POMDP extends an AC-MDP by considering a
probability distribution pi : Σ → [0, 1] over states and a set Θ of observations.
Definition 3 An Access Control Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
is a tuple 〈Σ,A,P, Θ, C,W〉 where Σ = I × R is a set of access control states,
A is a set of decisions, P : Σ ×A×Σ → [0, 1] is the probability function, such
that P(σi, a, σj) stands for the probability of reaching the state σj by executing
the decision a from the state σi, Θ is a set of observations, C : A × Θ × Σ →
[0, 1] is the observation model, such that C(a, θ, σj) stands for the probability
that we observe θ when we are in state σj and our last decision was a, and
W : Σ ×A×Σ → U is the reward function, such that U is a utility domain and
W(σi, a, σj) stands for the reward associated with executing the decision a from
the state σi and arriving in the state σj. When no confusion can arise, we write
paij, c
a
jθ and w
a
ij for P(σi, a, σj), C(a, θ, σj) and W(σi, a, σj), respectively.
We write qai for the immediate reward for executing the decision a in the
state σi:
qai =
∑
j,θ
paij · cajθ · waij
One of the most well-known examples for the use of POMDPs is the Tiger
example given by Cassandra et al. [6], where there are two doors, and behind
one of them there is a tiger, the goal of the process being to choose which door
to open, and to preferably avoid the tiger. Since it is not known behind which
door the tiger is, the process can decide to listen, instead of choosing directly a
door. Listening leads to collect an observation indicating, with some uncertainty,
behind which door the tiger is. Intuitively, the more the process listens, the more
certain it becomes about the location of the tiger. However, listening has a cost,
and the more the process listens, the lower the final reward will be. Hence, the
aim of the process is to find the best trade-off between listening and choosing a
door.
Instead of knowing the actual state, the process knows a probability distribu-
tion over the possible current states, and we call the belief state such a probability
distribution. More formally, a belief state is a function pi : Σ → [0, 1], such that
pi(σi) represents the probability for the system to be in the current state σi.
When no confusion can occur, we write pii for pi(σi). In general, it can be hard
to calculate such a belief state at any time. In practice, assuming that the initial
belief state is known, we can calculate the following ones inductively. Indeed,
given a decision a, an observation θ and a belief state pi, we can calculate the
following belief state pi′j using Baye’s rule:
pi′j =
∑
i pii · paij · rajθ∑
i,j pii · pai,j · rajθ
Given a decision a, an observation θ and a belief state pi, we write T (pi, a, θ)
for the new belief state where each component is calculated according to the
previous formula. A policy is now a function from belief state to decisions, and
the definition of the value function of a policy δ is:
V δ(pi) =
∑
i
pii q
δ(pi)
i + β
∑
i,j,θ
pii p
δ(pi)
ij c
δ(pi)
jθ V
δ(T (pi, δ(pi), θ))
The optimal policy can therefore be calculated by:
δ∗(pi) = arg max
a∈A
∑
i
pii q
a
i + β
∑
i,j,θ
pii p
a
ij c
a
jθ V
δ∗(T (pi, a, θ)) (6)
Solving a POMDP is in general complex, and there exist several algoritms
to approximate this function. The aim of this paper is not to provide an actual
solution, but to reduce the access control problem to a known problem, and we
refer to [5] for more details about solving algorithms.
Running Example We describe here an example inspired by the tiger one,
where the registration of subjects is uncertain, that is, given a subject si, it is
not certain whether regi = 0 or regi = 1. Such situation typically happens
in open systems, when no authentication is required. In order to make some
decision, the process might need to know if the subject is registered or not. We
therefore introduce, for each subject si a new decision checki, which can raise
one of the two observations θir and θ
i
n, respectively meaning that it has been
observed that the subject si is registered or not. We consider here that only the
decision checki can bring an observation about the registration of subjects, and
thus we also introduce an observation θ∅, which stands for the null observation.
Hence, given a state σj = (reg, cf ,m,mit, r), we define the function C for each
observation in Θ = {θir, θin, θ∅} as follows:
C(a, θir, σj) =

0.9 if a = checki and regi = 1
0.1 if a = checki and regi = 0
0 otherwise
C(a, θin, σj) =

0.9 if a = checki and regi = 0
0.1 if a = checki and regi = 1
0 otherwise
C(a, θ∅, σj) =
{
1 if a 6= checki
0 otherwise
Note that we illustrate the fact that an observation does not necessarily bring
complete certainty over the current state. For instance, we specify that if the
subject si has been observed to be registered, i.e. the system observes θir, then
there is still a probability 0.1 that the subject is not actually registered.
5 Discussion
The framework we have presented in the previous sections allows a policy de-
signer to express, under the same formalism, the rewards associated with each
decision, the uncertainty related to the execution of such decisions, the uncer-
tainty related to the current knowledge of the system state, and to calculate the
according optimal policy.
The first point that needs to be discussed is whether the optimal policy
should be calculated beforehand, for each possible state, or at run-time, for the
current state of the system. Clearly, there is no definitive answer to this question,
as both approaches can be complex. Indeed, there is potentially a large number
of states, including many states that will never be reached, especially in the case
of AC-PODMPs, since the policy needs to be calculated for each possible state
distribution. On the other hand, calculating the optimal policy for a particular
state can be too complex for systems with limited resources, such as mobile
devices.
Different techniques could be used to address this problem, for instance by
investigating the general solutions for solving POMDPs, such as [15, 32, 35, 36].
Indeed, although it is usually intractable to find an optimal policy for a POMDP,
it is sometimes possible to calculate approximate solutions. Moreover, access
control systems have specific properties, and some analysis might lead to simplify
the problem in some cases. For instance, in some systems, a request to release an
access can be always accepted, regardless of the context. Similarly, the optimal
policy for a sequence of independent requests (for instance accessing objects in
different security domains) can be the sequence of optimal decisions for each
individual request. Identifying such sequences of requests can thus simplify the
problem.
In practice, many systems can be intuitively abstracted to a smaller system,
with a limited number of subjects/objects, as expressive as the original one.
For instance, consider the matrix based security model, as described by Lamp-
son [25]: an access is granted if the corresponding right belongs to the matrix,
and denied otherwise; although a concrete system can contain a large number
of subjects and/or objects, each security situation can be clearly reduced to a
system with a single subject s and two objects or1 and o
r
2 for each access right
r, such that s has the right r over or1 and not the right r over o
r
2. The number
of states for such a reduced model is quite limited, and therefore a global calcu-
lation can be considered beforehand. However, the problem of reducing systems
is not trivial in general, and it might not be possible to automate this process.
Since a reduced model must be as expressive as the concrete model, we also must
be able to compare them [38, 16].
The second point that can raise discussion is the definition of the reward
function. Indeed, it might be hard in general to specify the actual reward for
a specific decision or state. As we said in Section 2.3, although it is sometimes
possible to define the pecuniary cost in a given context, it is not always straight-
forward to define concrete utility values. It would be therefore useful to specify a
language providing basic constructs allowing to characterize the reward function,
such that the actual values can be inferred. In particular, one could consider
defining on the one hand priorities between subjects, objects, accesses, states,
and on the other hand conflictual and strictly forbidden situations. Moreover,
thresholds of uncertainty can be included.
6 Conclusion - Future Works
We have presented in this paper a framework representing an access control
problem as a decision problem, and using the well-known notion of (Partially-
Observable) Markov Decision Process to represent an access control decision
process. We have introduced the concepts of Access Control Decision Process
(AC-DP, Section 2), with no uncertainty involved; of Access Control Markov De-
cision Process (AC-MDP, Section 3), with uncertainty about the future states of
the system; and of Access Control Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(AC-PODMP), which adds uncertainty about the current state of the system.
Each of these processes is a generalization of the previous one, with increasing
uncertainty, and the general equation for defining an optimal policy for an AC-
POMDP is given by Equation (6). In other words, if the policy/system designer
is able to provide all the different parameters of this equation (i.e. the state de-
scription, the reward function and the uncertainty parameters), we can calculate
automatically the optimal policy of the system.
These processes have been illustrated by a simple yet expressive example,
and several interesting observations have been made throughout the paper:
– Knowing the sequence of requests allows the system to make more optimal
decisions than knowing a single request (running example of Section 2.4).
– Mitigation decisions are considered at the same level than standard decisions
(extended running example of Section 2.4).
– Attack patterns and statistical user behavior can be modeled through prob-
abilistic sequences of requests (running example of Section 3.2).
– Probabilistic failure of security mechanisms can be taken into account (run-
ning example of Section 3.3).
– Uncertainty over states and autonomous measures are also considered (run-
ning example of Section 4).
It is worth emphasizing that our approach, by providing a quantitative analysis,
allows the process to make autonomous decisions, such as the enforcement of
mitigation techniques or the auditing of subjects/objects. We thus shift from a
traditional view where the access control mechanism is an interactive, passive
system, which takes access requests and acts accordingly, to a more dynamic
view, where the access control mechanism is an active system, which inspects
the current state of the system and takes the appropriate measures in order to
reach an optimal utility.
A clear limitation of our approach is that it relies on the one hand on the
definition of the reward function, which, as we discussed in the previous section,
has yet to be defined for most access control systems and is not trivial, and
on the other on the definition of the actual uncertainty of the system. Indeed,
the calculation of the probability function P and of the observation model C
can be quite complex in practice, at it might be hard to give concrete values
for them. However, we believe that the lack of these values is partly due to the
absence of incentive for defining them. In other words, collecting such values is
pointless without tools to analyze and treat them. We think that by providing a
quantitative access control framework, such as the one presented in the paper,
field experts will gain interest in these techniques and provide ways to collect
and/or observe the utility and uncertainty values, in a similar way that finance
expert have been providing models for markets in order to use decision processes.
Moreover, we hope that specifying the use of MDPs and POMDPs in an access
control context will help building a bridge between the access control community
and the decision theory community.
Several leads need to be considered in the future. Firstly, MDPs and POMDPs
have been well studied in the literature, and as we discussed in the previous Sec-
tion, we need to investigate how existing resolution techniques, such as [15, 32,
35, 36], can apply to the access control problem. Secondly, as mentioned in the
previous Section, a specific language for the definition of the reward function
could be helpful for the policy designer. Clearly, it could be useful to start from
existing policy languages, such as XACML [29], by adding the notion of reward
instead of directly using the decisions. Moreover, languages for defining workflow
satisfiability problems [9, 39] can also provide a good source of inspiration, as
they deal with conflict and priority issues.
Thirdly, the concept of risk strategy needs to be made explicit in the frame-
work. Indeed, in Section 2.4, we use the maximum function in order to get the
optimal value for the policy in Equation (3). In practice, the policy designer
might want to use a finer-grained choice, according to the desired risk expo-
sure. For instance, gaining with certainty $200 has the same expected gain than
gaining $600 with a chance of 1/2 and to a loss of $200 with a chance of 1/2.
However, intuitively, a risk averse process will choose the former while a system
trying to reach the highest possible gain will choose the latter. Hence, there is a
need for defining a risk strategy, also including the aggregated risk or the uncer-
tainty over the uncertainty, for instance when probability distribution functions
are used instead of simple probabilities.
Finally, complex environments, where it is not always possible to define a
single rule to classify accesses or states, require policy composition languages [30,
4, 10]. Situations with only bad outcomes are usually dealt with by composing
exception policies [1, 11]. With our approach, the notion of exception should be
directly included in the reward function, as we did in the running example of
Section 2.3. Hence, it would be interesting to look at the composition of reward
functions in a way analogous to policy composition, and in particular, to find
out under which conditions the composition of two optimal policies is also an
optimal policy.
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